Independent Reviews
David Lazer, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Emergent Actors is an excellent book. At its core is what
I would view as a right-minded attempt to dislodge the state from the
sacred spot it holds in international relations (IR) theory. Drawing
liberally on literatures of development, IR theory and philosophy of
science it lays out a methodology to deconstruct - and then reconstruct
- the state, outlining a modelling approach that I hope will be built
on by future scholars. »»
Miriam Fendius Elman, American Political Science Review
These points aside, Emergent Actors in World Politics is
an impressive book that nicely weaves cutting-edge formal modeling and
counterfactual thought experiments with a diverse set of real-world
examples. Cederman's empirical knowledge is particularly impressive. He
effortlessly shifts from historical to contemporary cases, providing
insights into nationality formation and nationalist reactions within
the Habsburg Empire, the European Union, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet
Union. Although not for the IR beginner, experts looking for an
intelligent study that goes beyond the typical should find Cederman's
book good value for the money. »»
Timothy G. Fay in International Relations, Volume XIII, No 5, August 1997
This book constitutes an innovative and refreshing
synthesis of the current state of international relations (IR) studies.
Unfortunately, it fails in its stated aim of service as the
intellectual bridge over the metaphorical river separating the
neorealist and neoliberal schools of IR thought. By complete dependence
on computer modelling, code writing, and multiple variable and rule
application, Cederman is hard pressed to demonstrate his model's
independence from the classical neorealist position. It seems more
probable that the quantity of criticism levelled at the realist school
is Cederman's attempt to seduce the ever technology-wary neoliberals.
Nevertheless, this text, and its unique use of advanced computer
modelling techniques, should be considered an essential reader for the
advanced IR student. The breadth and depth of the analysis presented
effectively summarizes the science's core concepts and key authors
without excessive reiteration. Especially effective is the application
of Cederman's analysis of Deutsch's theory of emergent assimilation
nationalism found in the second half of the study. While certainly not
the Holy Grail of modern international relations analysis, Lars-Erik
Cederman's innovative approach and concise synthesis are a welcome
addition to the serious IR literature.
The initial three chapters are a useful review of the
current state of the IR science. Cederman carefully constructs a
convincing and logical justification for the use of modelling and
simulation in IR analysis. He proceeds with a thorough explanation of
his proposed computer modelling process, aptly labelled Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS). Other current uses for this modelling
highlighted include the examination of cloud formation and weather
patterns, and Cederman uses these examples to link CAS modelling to IR
analysis. Cederman then carefully defines his terminology to prevent
reader confusion and provide common reference. One example is his
selection of the often-referenced Weberian definition of state and
nation. While somewhat lengthy for an introduction, Cederman clearly
manages to build an effective platform from which to launch his
proposition. The only initially evident shortcoming is the synthesis of
the IR science as a simple two-variable scheme. This synthesis
encapsulates the entire IR theory landscape in a three-by-three
opposing field of states and nations, with each characterized as either
absent, reified or emergent.
While definitely illustrative if somewhat oversimplified,
Cederman commits the same crime he alleges of the neorealists. This
scheme notably lacks consideration for the evolution of the science and
effectively freezes IR theory in a two-dimensional prison in a multiple
dimension reality. In this theoretical framework, there is no
possibility of evolution or self-education. Only complete categorical
linear shifts are possible, implying distinctive limits on the
possibilities and the desirable. This presentation does offer, however,
a very neat and concise framework from which to construct the
justification of CAS modelling in the following chapters.
In chapters four and five, Cederman finally introduces his Complex Adaptive System modelling and applies it to the development of an imaginary world with 400 initial states competing in a twenty-by-twenty grid. Predator and prey states are randomly introduced in varying proportions with a series of initially simple rules applied to model conflict outcome. Cederman categorizes the results and graphically summarizes the surviving number of states from each of the numerous iterations. He categorizes the resulting 'world' as either unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or more. It is here, after Cederman introduces the first iterations of his emergent polarity model, where he elects three basic neorealist propositions to test with his CAS modelling. The assumption is a bipolar or multipolar world in a world of power politics and power politics equates to stability and peace. The propositions follow: 1) anarchy promotes power politics; 2) domination by defensive military technology over offensive technology will increase the probability of power politics; 3) defensive alliances also increase the probability of power politics.
In chapters four and five, Cederman finally introduces his Complex Adaptive System modelling and applies it to the development of an imaginary world with 400 initial states competing in a twenty-by-twenty grid. Predator and prey states are randomly introduced in varying proportions with a series of initially simple rules applied to model conflict outcome. Cederman categorizes the results and graphically summarizes the surviving number of states from each of the numerous iterations. He categorizes the resulting 'world' as either unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or more. It is here, after Cederman introduces the first iterations of his emergent polarity model, where he elects three basic neorealist propositions to test with his CAS modelling. The assumption is a bipolar or multipolar world in a world of power politics and power politics equates to stability and peace. The propositions follow: 1) anarchy promotes power politics; 2) domination by defensive military technology over offensive technology will increase the probability of power politics; 3) defensive alliances also increase the probability of power politics.
Interestingly, the initial iterations of the emergent
polarity model support proposition one but immediately call into
question the validity of propositions two and three. The various
iterations seem to support the concept of defensive technology and
alliances actually promoting hegemony, the opposite of classic
neorealist expectations. Cederman is quick to highlight this seemingly
contradictory result and suggest this should be no surprise to
neorealists who often invoke classic economic theory comparisons in
their discourse. Cederman reviews the negative impact of tariffs and
protective regional trading blocs on overall economic efficiency as
held in generally accepted classic economic theory. He then makes the
metaphoric leap applying this argument to defensive technology and
alliances in the political realm. Very simply summarized, Cederman
supports the contention that defences and alliances provide an
artificial time period of divided weakness which permits a single
hegemon to expand unchecked by other potential rivals. These other
potential powers do not have the opportunity to grow 'naturally' and
hence challenge the hegemon due to these artificial system impediments.
A real world example of this phenomenon is offered in the city-state
alliance system of Renaissance Italy and the failure to confront
growing hegemonic power outside of the system.
As he progresses, Cederman continually adds further
variables in an attempt more closely to represent reality. Introduced
are defensive alliances, modifiable sensitivity to perceived threats,
actor adaptation and 'learning', modified resource distribution and
eventually even the possibility of intra-state national succession.
Each iteration and additional variable drives the CAS model further
towards neorealist expectations of political behaviour. By the last
iteration presented, the graphical bipolar and multipolar wedge
Cederman defines as the reign of power politics is dominant. This
result clearly begs the question regarding further model adaptation or
variable introduction, but, unfortunately, this tantalizing prospect is
not touched upon.
While an intellectually controversial topic of academic
consideration, Cederman's manipulation of economic political theory
application leaves him open to concerted criticism. The comparison of
alliances and defensive technology with protective tariffs and regional
trading blocs, while stimulating, may be difficult to sustain. The
neorealists can equally make the claim that defensive alliances more
closely simulate cooperatives, which can greatly increase economic
efficiency and competition and impede the hegemonic monopoly of large
business. Defensive technology could also be related as a product
modification or market niche strategy or, better yet, a delaying tactic
to milk economic 'cash-cows' in an effort to garner resources and
launch an 'offensive' operation on another 'front.' Overall, it appears
that Cederman's use of this metaphorical prescription is a masterful
manipulation of the reader's subject matter knowledge with little
detailed defence offered. This is a crafty grab for the reader's
interest, if not concordance, which almost demands further discussion.
It is with this elevated level of interest that the reader terminates
with the emergent polarity model and begins with the most stimulating
part of the study, Cederman's analysis of nationalism in a
multinational state.
Cederman initiates this enlightening analysis with a
definitive summary of the current variations of nationalism present in
an evolving world. The differences between Western, Central-Southern,
and Eastern European nationalism are effectively accentuated. This
carefully constructed explanation is...