GeoContest: Modeling Strategic Competition in Geopolitical Systems

Social Science Computer Review 26(4): 510–18.

The authors present GeoContest, a modeling framework for geopolitical competition among states. Building on the Geosim model, GeoContest models the evolution of state systems through conquest. However, instead of hard wiring the strategic behavior of states, GeoContest allows for their decision‐making mechanism to be plugged into the simulation as a module. Thus, experiments with states’ strategic behavior can be performed. This article gives a nontechnical introduction to GeoContest, outlining the design and illustrating application. The authors start with tournaments using simple aggressive and peaceful strategies showing that greed for conquest does not pay off and successful attackers have to carefully examine their own and the opponents’ capabilities. They also demonstrate that relying on nonaggression pacts can successfully compete against a cautious aggressor strategy. In a final series of experiments, the authors examine the question of whether artificial state actors overestimating their military capabilities have a selective advantage in the international competition, as suggested in the literature.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894439307313516

DOI: 10.1177/0894439307313516

Weidmann, Nils B., and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2008. “GeoContest: Modeling Strategic Competition in Geopolitical Systems.” Social Science Computer Review 26(4): 510–18.

@article{geocontest,
   author = {Weidmann, Nils B. and Cederman, Lars-Erik},
   title = {GeoContest: Modeling Strategic Competition in Geopolitical Systems},
   journal = {Social Science Computer Review},
   volume = {26},
   number = {4},
   pages = {510-518},
   year = {2008},
   doi = {10.1177/0894439307313516},
   abstract = {The authors present GeoContest, a modeling framework for geopolitical competition among states. Building on the Geosim model, GeoContest models the evolution of state systems through conquest. However, instead of hard wiring the strategic behavior of states, GeoContest allows for their decision-making mechanism to be plugged into the simulation as a module. Thus, experiments with states' strategic behavior can be performed. This article gives a nontechnical introduction to GeoContest, outlining the design and illustrating application. The authors start with tournaments using simple aggressive and peaceful strategies showing that greed for conquest does not pay off and successful attackers have to carefully examine their own and the opponents' capabilities. They also demonstrate that relying on nonaggression pacts can successfully compete against a cautious aggressor strategy. In a final series of experiments, the authors examine the question of whether artificial state actors overestimating their military capabilities have a selective advantage in the international competition, as suggested in the literature.},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894439307313516}
}