Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace

@article{power-sharing,
   title = {Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace},
   author = {Bormann, Nils-Christian and Cederman, Lars-Erik and Gates, Scott and Graham, Benjamin A. T. and Hug, Simon and Str{\o}m, Kaare W. and Wucherpfennig, Julian},
   volume = {63},
   number = {1},
   pages = {84--100},
   year = {2019},
   journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
   doi = {10.1111/ajps.12407},
   url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12407},
   eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12407},
   abstract = {Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.}
}